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The demolition of the mausoleums in Timbuktu, the destruction of the Temple of Bel 
in Palmyra, and the aerial bombardment of the Old City of Sana’a in Yemen - each 
mark a continuing trend of intentionally targeting cultural property, and disregard for 
its protection under international humanitarian law. From as far back as records of 
war exist, through to contemporary conflicts, cultural sites have been a target for 
states and non-state armed groups. The destruction is used as a means to delegitimise 
opponents and displace their populations, reject the symbols of a regime, disrupt a 
sense of continuity for communities and corrode collective identities. (Brosché et al. 
2017; & Ascherson 2005) While international law has focused on a three-P approach 
(hereafter ‘PPP’), imposing obligations on states to preserve, protect and prosecute 
the destruction of cultural property, treaties in this area remain silent on the aftermath 
of such violence with little attention to reconstruction or reparative measures, thus 
further endangering sites. Moreover, such treaties emphasise the physical and 
proprietary manifestations of heritage, neglecting its more intangible manifestations 
that are equally destroyed – such as language, traditions, oral history, songs and dance 
(Blake 2017). As a result there is a vast lacuna in addressing the real impact of war on 
communities whose cultural heritage, and through it the cultural bonds between 
individuals and across generations, is destroyed.   
Notwithstanding the high stakes, reparations for the destruction of cultural 
property were neglected as an approach in international law and practice, since 
destroying or looting cultural property were often treated as legitimate reprisals1 or 
spoils of war.2 There is some emerging literature that uncovers the serious harm 
caused by the destruction of cultural heritage (Novic 2016), and heritage studies 
explores the significance of cultural heritage for communities and the challenges of 
reconstructing it in the aftermath of conflict (Viejo Rose 2013). However, there has 
been little analysis of the legal regime for reparations for the destruction of cultural 
heritage. There is growing attention to reparations for indigenous people and their 
culture  (Lenzerini 2008; Article 11(2), United Nations 2007); but not in terms of 
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conflict related destruction and post-conflict transitions (Vrdoljak 2008 & 2011). 
Most of the literature on cultural property focuses on its destruction in armed conflict 
and the current PPP legal regime (Cunliffe et al 2016; O’Keefe 2006; Woodhead 
2014), reflecting a property law focus in response to the mass looting of art and other 
cultural property during the Second World War, and neglecting the destruction of 
immoveable and intangible cultural heritage and its impact on communities, groups 
and peoples. There is increasing recognition of cultural property and heritage being 
protected not only for their historic/cultural value, but also because of what they 
represent to the identity and culture of particular groups of people (Abtahi 2001). 
Leaving aside issues of looting of moveable cultural property and restitution 
efforts since the World Wars, this article traces emerging customary practice on the 
award of reparations for the destruction of cultural property. We are especially 
interested in approaches that go beyond restitution and try to engage with the harm 
caused to groups and communities affected by cultural loss. In particular we argue 
that the PPP approach should be adjusted to reflect the emerging practice of 
reparations, drawing from the growing scope of heritage studies. We argue that 
talking about reparations refocuses attention beyond tangible property, and only then 
can we address the harm suffered by victims and communities when their cultural 
heritage is deliberately targeted. 
 
The Emerging Recognition of Reparations for the Destruction of Cultural 
Heritage in International Law 
Since the nineteenth century, international humanitarian law has provided rules 
against damaging or occupying cultural property during armed conflict, and has 
punished those who intentionally or through negligence damage or destroy such 
property (O’Keefe 2006, 13-34). Despite these proscriptions, international law adopts 
a rather fatalistic view on reparations, as was apparent in the Jokić case concerning 
the shelling of Dubrovnik:  
‘Restoration of buildings of this kind, when possible, can never return the 
buildings to their state prior to the attack because a certain amount of original, 
historically authentic, material will have been destroyed, thus affecting the 
inherent value of the buildings.’3 
 
Such a view of reparations assumes that the authenticity of cultural heritage is entirely 
dependent on its materiality. It also presents heritage as fixed in a historic moment 
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and unchanging, when it might better be understood as the outcome of a continuous 
process of interpretation and meaning-making. (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995; Harvey 
2001) As a consequence, attention has been placed on prosecution and punishment in 
the hope of deterring future perpetrators, but this leaves little remedy for the victims 
of such crimes or satisfactory measures of repair.  
The destruction of cultural property was first internationally penalised under 
Article 56 of the 1899 Hague Convention,4 which stipulated reparations through 
compensation to injured parties to be paid by the responsible state for its violations.5 
During the drafting of the Genocide Convention delegates also proposed that 
appropriate redress should look to the ‘reconstitution of the moral, artistic and cultural 
inheritance of the group (reconstruction of monuments, libraries, universities, 
churches, etc., and compensation to the group for its collective needs)’.6 But again the 
punitive approach prevailed in the final draft of the Genocide Convention, which 
dropped all reference to remedy or reparation, focusing on prosecution and 
punishment, rather than cultural destruction and reparations.  
This protect, preserve and prosecute (PPP) approach is evident in the 1954 
Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict.7 In terms of reparations the drafters of the Convention found that ‘the 
possibility of civil reparations is of very minor interest when we are concerned with 
property which is essentially irreplaceable’.8 Reparations are mentioned in the First 
Protocol of the 1954 Convention, which explicitly prohibits the expropriation of 
cultural property by invading armed forces in response to a country breaching its 
international obligations.9 This may suggest that cultural property cannot be retained 
as the spoils of war and that there is an obligation to return such property after a 
conflict. (Lijnzaad 2010: 154) The 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property, under Article 38 stipulates that the Convention 
does not affect state responsibility, in particular reparations. State responsibility for 
breaches of international obligations was set down in the Chorzow Factory case 
(1927):  
‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves 
an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is 
the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is 
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.’10  
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Accordingly the lack of reference to reparations in the 1954 Hague Convention does 
not mean that reparations cannot derive from a state’s failure to fulfil its obligations 
therein. 
The absence of a concerted reparation approach to the damage and destruction 
of cultural property in international law has led to the development of soft law 
approaches through resolutions of international organisations and professional bodies 
with mandates for the protection of cultural heritage. For the most part these 
organisations have concentrated on the protection of cultural heritage and preventive 
measures with regards to its intentional destruction. ICCROM, for instance, has been 
running training in ‘First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis’ for a number of 
years, and there have been comparable initiatives from UNESCO, the Council of 
Europe and ICOMOS.11 The destruction of the Old Town of Warsaw in particular 
inspired a change in attitudes towards what constitutes authenticity when a heritage 
site is so completely destroyed that it has to be reconstructed with very limited 
original material. In order to inscribe the rebuilt Old Town of Warsaw as World 
Heritage, the understanding of authenticity and legitimate restoration inscribed in the 
Venice Charter (1964) had to be reconsidered. Yet, despite the important amount of 
work on post-war reconstruction and recovery of cultural heritage that often includes 
careful assessment of its potential for reconciliation,12 until recently the remedial 
approach has largely focused on the restitution of cultural property unlawfully 
removed during armed conflicts.13 Where the work of these organisations has most 
approached remedial approaches is in relation to reparations to the cultural destruction 
and harm suffered by indigenous communities. (Vrdoljak 2008).  
This paucity of reparations for destruction of cultural property is anomalous 
given the increasing importance such measures are given in remedying states’ 
breaches of international law. Reparations in international law are meant to restore the 
injured party to status quo ante (original position) through restitutio in integrum 
(return to the victim all they have lost) (Shelton  2005, 9 and 25).14 The Permanent 
Court of International Justice stated in the Chorzow Factory case that reparations are 
intended to ‘as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed’.15 This approach was to a large extent applied in the reconstruction 
of Mostar Bridge, where the rebuilding was carried out with great care to use the 
original materials and replicate the destroyed structure, but not under the rubric of 
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state responsibility for wrongful acts, but as a means of reconciliation (Viejo Rose 
2013, 128). The aspiration of reconstructing a heritage site as if the act of violence 
that destroyed it had not been committed however, has been criticised as counter-
productive to the aims of socio-cultural recovery (Viejo Rose 2013, 135). Arguably it 
prosecution at the ICTY also signifies greater attention to individual criminal 
responsibility rather than state responsibility for the destruction of cultural property 
(Vrdoljak 2011, 18).  
International human rights law has given more depth to redress, looking 
beyond inter-state claims to allow individuals and communities to seek redress against 
the state. Human rights courts have also recognised the individual and collective, 
moral and pecuniary, physical and psychological dimensions of harm caused to 
attacks on cultural heritage. This more holistic approach uses a number of 
complementary remedies that seek to adequately and appropriately acknowledge and 
alleviate the suffering of the victim(s). In particular human rights has recognised the 
cultural value of heritage when it comes to indigenous or tribal peoples, though there 
have been a few cases involving destruction of cultural property during conflict. This 
case law, discussed further below, has taken on board the suffering of communities 
affected by the destruction of cultural heritage and tries to provide appropriate forms 
of reparations. 
 
The harm caused by the destruction of cultural heritage 
Cultural heritage can suffer various types of harm during armed conflict. The harm 
begins as virulent propaganda, which sets the scene for violence propagating 
exclusionary narratives, setting new norms, and redrawing the lines of belonging. 
Cultural heritage is particularly vulnerable to attack during this early phase either as 
representing a past to be discarded – consider revolutionary moments such as the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966) during which the Four Olds were targeted: Old 
Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas – or as a manifestation of difference 
that is no longer tolerated, such as Cham mosques in Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia 
(Killean et al 2018). As armed conflict looms the depletion of human resources further 
makes cultural heritage vulnerable as government structures weaken, professional 
activities are disrupted, rule of law collapses, and personnel are denied access to the 
heritage sites and collections under their care. Heritage sites are also deliberately 
targeted for the menacing messages such actions send to local, national and 
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international onlookers, e.g. the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues of 
Bamiyan (Singh, 2014).  
 Violence against heritage can target all of its manifestations including 
structures and monuments, spaces and landscapes, movable items and artefacts, as 
well as traditions and ways of life. Depending on the motivations and aims of the 
destruction, physical harm to structures can take many forms, from the obliteration of 
a site to more symbolic gestures of decapitating statues depicting political, religious 
or cultural leaders. The physical destruction of a site can also be carried out in a way 
that targets the intangible heritage of communities – for instance mosques being used 
as pig corals – causing moral harm and damaging social cohesion by erasing 
communal meeting spaces. The forced displacement of people further transforms 
cultural spaces as traditional habitations are abandoned by one group, occupied by 
another, communities are dispersed or herded together in camps for refugees or 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Events of the conflict itself also have an effect 
marking spaces with new narratives of massacres, resistance, heroism, or death. 
 Heritage sites frequently sustain economies at various scales. At the local level 
sellers of souvenirs and tour guides can come to rely heavily on tourists and pilgrims 
for income as do the providers of related services including accommodation, food 
provision, and transportation for their revenue. Nationally, cultural heritage driven 
tourism has become such a central element of economies around the world that its 
destruction can have a similar effect to removing a key industrial sector: annual 
tourist income in Croatia for instance, which today accounts for nearly 20% of the 
country’s GDP, was severely affected by war and its aftermath (Orsini and Ostojić  
2018). These are the direct economic impacts of cultural destruction; indirectly it also 
results in a loss of investment in a region and in the depletion of local capacity, as 
anyone with the means flees the conflict, often staying abroad even once this had 
ended. The combination of the financial neglect and population/skills loss, with the 
accompanying blight as places are abandoned, results in a far-reaching economic 
consequences.       
 The moral harm dimension of cultural property destruction was first addressed 
in the context of indigenous populations. The UNESCO Declaration of San José 
(1981) defines ethnocide as where: ‘an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, 
develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, where collectively or 
individually. This involves an extreme form of massive violation of human rights and, 
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in particular, the right to ethnic groups to respect for their cultural identity…’.16 The 
moral harm represented by being denied these rights is further accentuated by the fear 
caused by being having ones cultural sites and practices singled out for destruction, 
living under constant threat that one’s identity will cause one to be targeted, the 
exclusion from a reframed notion of who is included in the national group, and the 
constant portrayals of one’s cultural identity as inferior and deviant from a redefined 
norm of acceptability. Subsequent human rights jurisprudence has increasingly tried 
to capture this harm and reflect it in approach reparations, which looks beyond the 
individual past harm to the present collective suffering and future existence. 
  The increasing criminalisation of the destruction of cultural property in 
international criminal law seeks to capture this more anthropocentric understanding of 
the harm, going beyond property to recognise harm to communities and people 
connected to it (Abtahi 2001). This includes war crimes of ‘internationally directing 
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments’; persecution of a group or individuals’ cultural identity 
as a crime against humanity; and even the requirement of mental intent for 
genocide.17 While the intentions underlying the destruction of cultural heritage can be 
difficult to pin-down, criminalisation of the destruction of cultural property is 
intended to capture the criminal intent to wipe out the shared heritage and existence of 
minority groups, as seen with the attacks against the Yazidi by ISIS in Iraq,18 or 
desecration and destruction of Cham mosques in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge 
regime (Killean et al 2018). As such, such physical destruction of the cultural 
manifestations of the group can rupture the social connections and trust between 
individuals, families and communities within such a group and the rest of society, 
who can feel intimidated from practicing their culture, increasing socially 
marginalised and isolated.  
 Further impacts occur when communities are prohibited from practicing their 
religions, speaking their languages, or transmitting their stories and values to younger 
generations. Such loss is further exacerbated when the religious and cultural leaders 
of communities are targeted, for when the conveyors of a community’s history and 
values are killed this truncates their transmission into the future and creates ruptures 
that are difficult to overcome subsequently.19 These can be viewed as collective and 
inter-generational harms to a community, since tangible and intangible heritage are 
the principal means by which older generations pass down and communicate 
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collective memory and shared identity to present and future generations. They can 
also cause spiritual harm. In the case of Al Mahdi involving the destruction of the 
World Heritage site by Islamist militants, the targeting of the ancient mausoleums that 
the community believed spiritually protected Timbuktu from bad fortune, ‘shattered 
the community’s collective faith that they were protected.’20 The attack by Ansar 
Dine not only caused them to lose their ability to worship the saints and their 
ancestors, but it also caused psychological and moral harm to the community in terms 
of their spiritual world view. Some of the victims who applied for reparations at the 
ICC spoke of their ‘shock’ and ‘bereavement’ at the destruction, which affected their 
emotional and spiritual well-being.21 This destruction of such nationally and 
internationally valued cultural property rippled out into Mali and the international 
community. The Malian Minister of Culture held that the attack on the World 
Heritage sites at Timbuktu as “an attack on what fuels our soul, on the very essence of 
our cultural values. Their objective was to destroy our past, our culture, our identity, 
and in fact our dignity.”22 Given the scale of harm caused by the destruction of 
cultural property, reparations can only deliver so much in remedying the past. 
Therefore to maximise resources, appropriate forms of redress must be made, and we 
turn to this in the next section. 
 
Making appropriate reparations for the destruction of cultural property and 
heritage 
Reparations cannot undo all the harm that has been caused, but it can serve to publicly 
acknowledge and alleviate some of the ongoing suffering of victims and affected 
communities. As such, reparations are in themselves expressions of moral messages 
of values in transitional societies from conflict or authoritarianism. Nevertheless, 
contemporary practice and human rights law strongly suggests that compensation or 
restitution is not enough, but reparations need to be appropriate to the harm caused, 
which necessarily requires victims to be involved in the design, process and 
implementation of such measures to ensure correctly align to their needs. In this 
section we outline some of the tensions around implementing appropriate reparations 
for destruction of cultural heritage including who is considered eligible as a victim, 
what forms reparations should take and who is responsible for carrying them out. The 
final section reflects on the reality of repairing cultural heritage after conflict. 
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Determining who is victimised 
As we have seen, the harm caused by the destruction of cultural property can be 
extensive, reaching across borders, peoples and generations, with, as the Hague 
Convention makes clear, potentially universal interest and impact. This raises difficult 
questions as to who can claim reparations for the destruction of cultural heritage. The 
law in this area usually focuses on maximising redress to those most proximately 
affected, a proposition which at least in part acknowledges the impossibility of 
addressing al facets of the loss.23 In the Al Mahdi case, the ICC recognised that, as 
Timbuktu was a World Heritage Site, Mali and the international community, 
represented by UNESCO, had suffered harm, but it addressed the proximity point by 
awarding them only a symbolic €1 each.24 The Court distinguished the inhabitants of 
Timbuktu as suffering ‘disproportionately more harm’ as a result of the attacks on the 
mausoleums.25 By concentrating reparations on the local community, who are 
responsible for maintaining the cultural heritage, the Court believed it would 
maximise the effect of reparations by strengthening their ability to preserve the site.26 
 There are also individual and collective dimensions to harm in prioritising 
who can claim reparations. The ICC in the Al Mahdi case held that those whose 
ancestors’ burial sites had been damaged suffered a more direct and intense form of 
moral suffering than the rest of the community in Timbuktu, therefore the Court 
prioritised compensation to these individuals, with collective memorial measures for 
the rest of the community.27 There also has been recognition that collective groupings 
or associations can claim reparations as victims, in addition to individuals. In a 
number of cases involving violation of the rights of Islamic and Roman Catholic 
individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic Srpska, these communities have 
been recognised as having legal standing as victims as legal persons. This is due to 
them qualifying for allegations of violations against their members as well as legal 
entities owning property that has its property rights infringed.28 This focus on 
individuals and communities most affected by the destruction of cultural property 
assists in making reparations more potent in their remedial value, but risks excluding 
those more indirectly affected. 
 
Appropriate forms of reparations 
Reparations are internationally recognised as encompassing five main forms to 
remedy serious violations of human rights and grave breaches of international 
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humanitarian law: restitution; compensation; rehabilitation; measures of satisfaction; 
and guarantees of non-repetition.29 Restitution includes restoration of property or 
rights. Compensation involves both pecuniary (quantifiable) and non-pecuniary 
(moral) awards to cover the cost and moral harm suffered by victims, whether through 
a lump sum or a pension. Rehabilitation entails physical and mental care, as well as 
social and legal services to heal a victim’s personal integrity and social functioning. 
Measures of satisfaction are public acknowledgements of victims’ harm and symbolic 
redress to reaffirm their dignity, such as memorials, apologies, recovery of those 
disappeared, and investigations. Guarantees of non-repetition are public commitments 
and reforms by the state to prevent violations recurring in the future, such as human 
rights training of the armed forces and civilian oversight. These measures are intended 
to be awarded together so as to complement their various strengths and weaknesses, 
as well as to assist in remedying the personal and moral nature of the harm caused. 
Given the property perspective on cultural objects and buildings, restitution 
has traditionally been viewed as a way to remedy wrongful appropriations. As part of 
the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the German government was ordered to return 
property it had confiscated in Belgium and France.30 Under the Treaty of Sevres 
(1920), provisions of restitution of homes and businesses of those forcibly displaced 
for fear of massacre, also provided that where victims had died without heirs, their 
property would be transferred to the community, not the state.31 Following this 
practice a restitution system was created to provide property (or compensation in lieu 
of property) to Jewish victims of the Holocaust in respect of property looted by the 
Nazis (see Taylor et al 2009). Restitution can also cover restoring land sites/titles to 
communities where new buildings have been built over destroyed cultural property, 
such as the case of Banja Luka where a new businesses had been built on the site of a 
destroyed mosque.32 Restitution-in-kind can also be ordered to victims, where it is 
impossible to transfer the land or property back to them, such as where new cultural 
property belonging to another community now occupies the site.33 
Rehabilitation of cultural property includes restoration of damaged and 
destroyed buildings, but it can also include measures to preserve and develop the 
cultural heritage of a group or people (Vrdoljak 2011, 18). The 1964 Venice Charter 
set out specific guidelines for the restoration of cultural property such that its 
authenticity and integrity might be preserved. Ideas about the aim and object of 
restoration however, have since evolved. The 1979 Australia ICOMOS Charter for the 
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Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance (known as the Burra Charter) 
introduced the notion of cultural significance as a measure of authenticity, to guide 
preservation, restoration and reconstruction in a way that looked beyond physical 
integrity to include the meaning of heritage for communities. The 1994 “Nara 
Document on Authenticity” updated the Venice Charter recognising that respecting 
cultural and heritage diversity required acknowledging that judgments about 
authenticity could be linked to a variety of sources of information and valuation that 
were not entirely dependant on material continuity but included essential intangible 
elements (Nara Document 1994, Arts. 5-13). More recently, the 2018 Warsaw 
guidelines of the World Heritage Committee34 have attempted to marry the needs of 
reconstructing cultural heritage sites destroyed by war while at the same time as 
protecting Outstanding Universal Value such that conditions of authenticity and 
integrity are not compromised. Importantly, amongst the set of principles set out in 
Warsaw are ones that highlight the importance of consulting with and obtaining the 
informed consent of affected communities, allowing time for reflection rather than 
knee-jerk reactions, and the delicate balance to be sought between memorialisation 
and reconciliation. Tensions in the objectives remain, not least between ambitions to 
‘build back better’, protect Outstanding Universal Value, and return to war-affected 
communities that which they have lost (World Heritage Committee 2018, 3-4) but the 
integration of nuance and acknowledgment of the possible contradictions is 
paramount.  
 Courts have been more inclined to focus rehabilitation on the human impact of 
cultural destruction on communities and groups.35 This can require the ‘necessary 
material, medical, psychological and social assistance’ to victims and affected 
communities to restore their ‘functional ability’ (United Nations 1985, Principle 14; 
Sandoval 2009, 8). Such harm has implications for subsequent and future generations 
within a group or community. In our own research on the Cham in Cambodia, a 
number of focus groups suggested that education would be an effective way of 
rehabilitating the intergenerational harm caused to the group’s cultural knowledge and 
traditions (Killean et al 2018). Other courts and transitional justice bodies have 
ordered or recommended that violations and the cultural history and practices of 
minority groups and indigenous peoples be integrated into national curriculums to 
preserve such groups’ heritage, promote reconciliation and to prevent their 
recurrence.36 
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Some victims or injured parties may prefer compensation instead of restitution 
for the damage caused to cultural property and heritage.37 Compensation has been 
awarded for the reconstruction of historic monuments and religious buildings 
destroyed during conflict. For instance the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
ordered $50,000 in compensation against Ethiopia for blowing up the 2,500 year old 
Stela of Matara obelisk in Eritrea,38 and awarded $4,500,000 to Ethiopia for the 
looting and shelling by Eritrean forces of 164 Ethiopian churches, mosques and 
associated buildings.39 Compensation can also be used to fund memorials or funeral 
arrangements in the appropriate cultural and religious way of a group for those who 
are killed.40  Compensation can be used to reimburse wide range of loss and harms, 
such as moral harm caused by damage to holy or religious sites and a group’s cultural 
identity,41 discrimination for cultural destruction,42 and economic loss.43  
Compensation for economic loss caused by damage to cultural property is 
somewhat more debateable, given the difficulty of measuring such loss. Generally 
international administrative claims commissions have rejected impacts on tourism as 
a basis for compensation, for being speculative and lacking sufficient evidence 
(Matheson 2012: 235).44 There is some recognition that compensation or financial 
development programmes may be appropriate for economic loss caused to 
communities, where their livelihood such as indigenous people and eco-tourism.45 In 
the case of Al Mahdi at the ICC, the Court ruled that compensation would only be 
paid to those whose ‘livelihoods exclusively depended’ on the mausoleums at 
Timbuktu.46 These included the guardians of the mausoleums, maçons responsible for 
maintaining them and businesses that would not exist without them, such as those 
which sold holy sand.47 For the wider community in Timbuktu the ICC ordered 
collective measures to be implemented to alleviate their economic loss, which 
included community-based educational and awareness raising programmes, 
return/resettlement programmes, and a ‘microcredit system’ that would assist the 
population to generate income.48 Trust funds have been established to assist 
community development in redressing the wider consequences of cultural 
destruction.49 This reflects that compensation alone cannot adequately alleviate the 
scale and communal nature of suffering caused by the destruction of cultural property.  
Courts have also ordered measures of satisfaction (e.g. apologies, memorials, 
and search for those disappeared) as means to acknowledge publicly and repair the 
moral harm suffered by victims and communities. Such measures are intended to 
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‘awaken … public awareness to avoid repetition’, and ‘maintain remembrance of the 
victim’,50 addressing those losses of ‘honour, dignity and prestige’ caused by a 
violation or crime that cannot be redressed by restitution or compensation, due to their 
intangible and unquantifiable nature.51 The patterns of such redress are nuanced and 
complex. Memorials, for example, can operate as physical reminders in public spaces, 
confronting society to recognise the moral harm caused to a group by the destruction 
of its culture. However, memorials are not a universal panacea and can also become 
sites of contestation by celebrating the instigators or leaders of armed conflict, 
marking the victims as martyrs of one part of the conflict while neglecting others. 
This selective and political memorialisation can impact future cohesion by signalling 
one group as having differently suffered from others or being more worthy of being 
remembered. Recent violence around Confederate monuments in Charlottesville and 
the protest movement against monumental commemorations of Cecile Rhodes 
provide contemporary examples of just how contentious memorials can come to be, 
particularly when they serve in part to silence victims of past violence (Maurantonio 
2018). 
Memorials manifested in stone are also a Western tradition not globally 
shared: more recent forms of memorials in Rwanda, for instance, or community peace 
museums in Kenya, illustrate that there can be more locally meaningful memorial 
gestures (Walters et al 2017). There is also a question about whether new memorials 
should be built or old ones modified/left damaged to evidence disturbance and 
rupture. One answer to this has been to add layers of interpretation to existing 
memorials, contextualising and updating them. Regardless of their intention behind 
the initial memorial gesture these inevitably change as the witnesses of events 
disappear, new voices are added to the interpretation of events, and collective 
memories themselves rewritten.52  
The forms of reparations discussed thus far are remedial in nature, but there 
may also be a need for more proactive measures to prevent the recurrence of such 
crimes in the future. Guarantees of non-repetition are commitments made by states to 
prevent past violations from reoccurring through reforming state institutions and 
tackling structural victimisation (Mégret 2009, 130). In the aftermath of the 
destruction of cultural property, communities may be displaced and fearful of 
returning to their homes in case of reprisals or discrimination. Guarantees of non-
repetition may comprise human rights training for military and police forces, 
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including sensitive treatment of minorities’ cultural practices; education on diverse 
cultures; security to allow displaced persons to return home; and repeal of 
discriminatory laws and practices that inhibit minority groups’ culture. For example 
the Treaty of Sevres, alongside providing restitution to victims of massacres and 
forced displacement, also required the Turkish government to remove perpetrators 
from the area involved.53 In Bosnia, in cases involving the Muslim graveyard in 
Prnjavor, courts have ordered the revocation of burial restrictions on grounds of 
discrimination and violation of the enjoyment of the right to freely practice religious 
beliefs.54  Such proactivity is particularly important in societies transitioning away 
from conflict, lest the narratives that drove such violence continue to dominate 
debates on reparations, where responsible actors try to obscure their responsibility and 
justify their actions through self-serving laws and politics. 
 
Who is responsible for repairing cultural property? 
If the destruction of cultural property during armed conflict can involve a range of 
actors pursuing different agendas and motivations, the reconstruction and 
commemoration landscape is no different. Varying actors are matched with varying 
aims: to recover what was lost or take the opportunity to build anew as though on a 
blank slate (Sørensen & Viejo Rose 2015). Reconstruction has manifold aspects, each 
with often complementary, but distinct agendas: re-visioning the post-war nation and 
its future; rewriting history to present the past in light of the conflict; remembering by 
re-inscribing the collective memorial narrative with new sites; re-codifying the 
politics of space with new value frameworks; and repairing the damage caused (Viejo 
Rose 2011,199). 
International law recognises individual and state responsibility for reparations, 
but it can take years to seek justice at national or international courts, or to find 
political agreement. In the meantime, affected communities find ways to rebuild. In 
Cambodia, after the Khmer Rouge destroyed dozens of mosques, the Cham 
community began to fundraise abroad to fund the reconstruction of their mosques, or 
the building of new ones (Killean et al 2018). ICCROM has also been running 
capacity building programmes in post-conflict countries so that communities can be 
trained, and just as importantly employed, to restore their own heritage sites.  
 Reconstruction can be a collaborative effort between donors, civil society, 
local community and national reparations programmes or international legal forums. 
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This can be seen in the aftermath of the Plan de Sanchez massacre in Guatemala, 
where survivors raised funds with the Catholic Church and NGOs to build a church to 
memorialise those killed, who were buried underneath it (Sanford 2003, 245). When 
the case reached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, alongside other 
reparations, it awarded $25,000 to the victim community for the chapel to support 
collective memory of the massacre by raising public awareness to avoid its recurrence 
and to ‘keep alive the memory of those who died.’55 
It is important to remember that reparations as a right serves as a measure of 
accountability. This distinguishes them from assistance, development or community 
rebuilding efforts, in that they acknowledge the wrongfulness of the violation 
committed against individuals or communities, and oblige those responsible to 
recognise such harm and make efforts to remedy the ongoing suffering. In the Al 
Mahdi case, where UNESCO had reconstructed most of the Timbuktu mausoleums, 
the ICC nonetheless found Mr Al Mahdi personally liable for €2.7 million. The Court 
did not take into consideration the efforts made by UNESCO as to do otherwise 
would ‘understate the amount of harm actually caused’ and ‘depriv[e] victims of their 
right to a remedy’.56 Perhaps a plausible intersection of reparations, assistance and 
development is that responsible actors could indemnify the cost of such 
reconstruction, and make public acknowledgements of responsibility and renunciation 
of such violence, and if appropriate an apology.  
 
The reality of repairing the destruction of cultural property after conflict 
Rebuilding what has been damaged or destroyed during conflict can be as politically 
motivated as the destruction that caused it. (Bevan 2016; 176) The reconstruction of 
cultural property can reflect the new power relations and tensions over whose cultural 
property is worth being rebuilt, whose suffering remembered, and even whom obtains 
the lucrative contracts to reconstruct. (Bevan 2016) Such reconstruction can also 
reflect the international community’s agenda or priorities, as with Mostar Bridge 
where the aim was not only to recover the heritage site, but also to symbolise and 
even to act as a motor of reconciliation. (Viejo Rose 2013,133) That the 
reconstruction project failed in this second reparative goal is an important lesson here. 
The reasons for the failure are multiple and have been discussed elsewhere (Viejo 
Rose 2013; and Mezev 2007), but they can be synthesised as: an indifference to fully 
appreciate the symbolic and intangible heritage of the site and its place within the 
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broader historic and socio-political heritage landscape of Mostar; a disregard to fully 
listen to the messages being sent locally on the decisions made in the reconstruction, 
including who was consulted and what company won the contract; and the insistence 
on a project time-frame that disregarded slower more inclusive approaches. 
The literature on reparations in transitional justice and on heritage 
reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict both identify the challenge of how the 
restoration should look. (Verdeja 2006; Viejo Rose 2013,126) There are questions 
about how far legal, political and architecture efforts should reconstitute what has 
been lost, and whether restoration to the pre-conflict situation adequately redress the 
harm caused. Indeed the focus of international law on preservation of past practices 
and cultural property may encourage such culture remaining static. (Mezey 2007, 
2005) At the same time such physical reconstruction of cultural property can also 
create a ‘parallel process of re-imagining the country’s past, recodifying its value 
system and formulating the resulting narratives.’(Viejo Rose 2013,127)  
There is a danger that the cultural identity and heritage of a targeted group are 
shackled to their past destruction. (Novic 2016, 196) This risks creating a simplified 
understanding of the harm, and ‘fixes’ a static notion of a group’s or people’s culture, 
which in itself is ‘unfixed, dynamic, and unstable’. (Mezev 2007, 2005) Memorials 
created to honour those killed in a group or community may become the focus of their 
cultural existence. Such reconstruction can also create a hierarchy of victimhood in 
designating which cultural property and heritage is to be reconstructed and preserved 
after a conflict, and is worth future generations to know and to remember. In turn such 
priorities exclude, silence and neglect other groups that do not fit the wider political 
narrative of the transition or those in power. This can be seen in the selective 
remembrance of the Spanish Civil War in Spain, where memorials only 
commemorated the Nationalists who had died in an attempt to obliterate the public 
remembrance of those Republican soldiers killed. (Viejo Rose 2103: 135)  
Alternatively, new influences can change the direction of the practice of 
heritage and the design of cultural property, according to the background of donors – 
including the possible preference of liberalised peacebuilding to eschew, for example, 
the reconstruction of religious buildings from reasons of multi-culturalism or 
neutrality (Viejo Rose 2013 & Barakat 2007); or the cultural fusion effected by the 
return of displaced persons. This can reflect a natural evolution of a group or people’s 
culture, which in itself grows through ‘appropriations, hybridizations, and 
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contaminations.’ (Mezey 2007: 2006) But there remains a risk that selective 
reconstruction accentuates the very divisions that it seeks to dilute, creating 
community division and reinforcing the motivations for destruction.  We find a 
possible example in Sarajevo for instance, where the international community funded 
the reconstruction of what was deemed to be the most representative building of each 
of three religious communities. 
Post-war contexts are marked by changed and often significantly imbalanced 
power relations between affected communities, and foreign actors, including donors. 
Such changes represent opportunities for foreign donors, ‘cultural entrepreneurs’, or 
international organisations, and this may impact the heritage landscape. For example 
in the Balkans, the rebuilding of traditionally Ottoman designed mosques in more 
Wahhabi architecture, reflected the support of the Saudi government. (Novic 2018: 
218-219; Viejo Rose 2007:112) While the involvement of the international 
community in the form of parachuting ‘experts’ in and out of situations and ‘sugar 
coating’ peacebuilding has proven to be ineffective, if not directly detrimental, the 
participation of the communities affected by cultural property destruction in the 
reconstruction process can be an important part of building their resilience and 
reconstituting essential elements of identity, agency, and dignity. This participation 
goes further than consultation and may include their input on design, process, and the 
articulation of their interests.(Barakat 2007:33)  
A further challenge is ensuring security in an area to allow those displaced or 
targeted to return to their homes. This is a particular problem in cases involving the 
intentional destruction of cultural heritage, where groups are singled out to be 
ethnically cleansed from an area. Such cases will require guarantees of non-repetition 
to protect minority groups and communities, as well as facilitate their return and 
reintegration where they have been displaced.57 In the Al Mahdi case, the ICC Trust 
Fund for Victims faces ongoing violence as it seeks to implement the reparations 
award, which creates difficulties on providing more public acknowledgment measures 
to avoid victims or the community being targeted. In the week of the reparation 
judgment, armed militants killed seven security guards at the UN peacekeeping 
base.58  
 There is also a sense of victim competition deprioritising reparations to groups 
who suffered destruction or damage to their cultural heritage, with priority given to 
programmes addressing physical harm. In such circumstances, a community or group 
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may come together to reconstruct their cultural property, perhaps seeking donor 
assistance; but the danger with this approach is that it neglects redressing the 
justifications that fuelled such destruction, and compelling those who caused the harm 
to face the consequences. While reparations are not a panacea, they can provide legal 
and political leverage to groups who have suffered from cultural destruction to seek 
redress for their harm. International norms on reparation need to be nuanced by the 
local context and the interests of the victims most affected by the destruction of 
cultural property. In itself international law provides a limited ambit for reparations 
for cultural property and heritage destruction, but the increasing jurisprudence and 
state practice in transitional societies is increasing recognising the importance of 
remedying the material, moral and cultural harm suffered by individuals, groups and 
communities. This does not mean cultural relativism should allow the dilution of 
states and other actors’ obligations to make reparations or ensure victims’ rights;59 but 
it does suggest the need for processes and practices of reflexivity between 
international law and the lived experience of victims. 
 
Conclusion 
The targeting of cultural property and the cultural practices of groups and 
communities causes serious damage to their well-being, dignity and continuity of 
identity and heritage.  While international organisations dedicated to heritage have 
been active in developing preventive measures for such destruction, creating risk 
preparedness plans, and leading some reconstruction efforts, the idea of reparations as 
remedial measures that the Al Mahdi case introduced are still relatively under-
explored. This article has sought to move beyond the focus of international law on the 
three Ps’ approach (protect, preserve and prosecute) to encourage a broader 
discussion on the place of reparations (PPPR).  
There is some nascent state practice and international jurisprudence on 
reparations for destruction and damage of cultural property, but there needs to be a 
broader vision of what this would look like in practice. In this article we have tried to 
set out what reparations for cultural heritage destruction could look like. We 
recognise that there are challenges in the reconstruction of cultural heritage after 
conflict, where the politics that drove the violence have not simply disappeared. 
Nevertheless, taking a reparations approach to this issue goes to the heart of the 
broader three Ps’ approach in ensuring that culture that is developed by individuals, 
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groups, communities and people should be cherished and maintained as a means to 
speak across time to future generations on the nature of humankind. This may require 
it to be stipulated in any future resolutions, conventions or treaties on cultural 
heritage. Reparations can help support communities and individuals to remedy past 
violations, but also should not be technocratically and top-down reproduced without 
the informed consent and participation of victims. A reparation approach to cultural 
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